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A SIMPLE AXIOMA7'IZATION Of NONADDITIVE
EXPECI'ED UTILITY
BY RAKESII SARIN ANU PE"1'ER WAKKERI
l'his paper prrrvidcs an cxtcnsion of Savage's suhjective expcctcd ulility thcory for
dccisions under uncertainty. It includes in Ihe sct of evcnts Ix~th unambiguous evcnts fur
which prohabilities arc atldilive and ambiguous evcnls for which prnhahilitics arc pcrmit-
tcd to he nonadditivc. 1'hc main axiom is cumulalivc tlominancc. which adapts stuchastic
duminance to decision making under uncertainty. We Jerive a('hcxluct expected utility
representation and show thal a mndilicalion of cumulativc Jnmin:mce Icads lo the
clasxical expected utility representation. The rclalinnship of our approach with Ih:d of
SchmeiJler, who uses a twu-stage formulation to dcrivc Chuyuct expccled utility, is :dso
explorecl. Our work may be viewed as a unilication of SchmeiJler (14R9) :md Gillria
(1987).
Kevwerntn: I`mhiguily, nonadditive probahitity, stochastic domitr.mcc, r;~nk-dcpendcnt
utility, nonexpected utility.
I. IN'rR01)UCI'ION
SAVncE's (1954) suu~EC-nvE cxrEC-rr:n UTILI'1'Y (SEU) theory has been widcly
adopted as the guide for rational decision making in thc facc of uncertainty. In
SEU theory both the probabilities and the utilities are derived from prcferences
(see also Ramsey (193U). This represents a hallmark contribution, as it avoids
the reliance on introspection for quantifying tastes and beliefs. We continue
in Savage's vein and extend his theory to dcrive a more general nonaddi-
tive expected utility representation, called Choquet expected utility (CEU).
Schmeidler (1989, lirst vcrsion 1982) made the first contribution in providing a
CEU representation and Gilboa (1987) cxtcndcd lhis work. We dcvclop this line
of research further by providing an intuitive axiomatization of CEU.
The key distinction between our work and that of Savage is that we identify
two types of events-unambiguous and ambiguous. Peoplc fecl relativcly "sure"
about the probabilities of unambiguous events. An example of an unambiguous
event could be the outcome of a toss of a fair coin (heads or tails). We assume
that Savage's axioms hold for a suflïciently rich set o["unambiguous acts", i.e..
acts measurable with respect to the unambiguous events. The probabilitics of
ambiguous events, however, are not known with precision. An example of such
an event could be next week's weather conditions (rain or sunshine). Ambiguity
in the probability of such events may be caused, for example, by a lack ~f
available information relative to the amount of conceivable information (Keynes
(192U). Most people exhibit a reluctance to bet on events with ambiguous
~ The support for Ihis research was prtrvided in part by the Decisinn, Risk, and M:magcment
Science branch of the National Science Foundation; the research ot Pcler Wakker has been madc
possiblc by a fellowship of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts anJ Sciences, anJ u fcllowship
of the Netherlands Organization (or Scientific Research.
The authors are thankful lo two referees for many detailed rnmmenls.
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prohabilitics. This rcluctancc Icads to a violation of Savagc's surc-thing princi-
plc (P2). " I'he Chcx)ucl cxpcctcd utility thcory proposcd hcrc dacs not imposc
thc sure-thing principlc for all cvcnts and is lhcrcfurc capablc of pcrmitting a
liking for specificity and a dislike for ambiguity in probability.
Thc key condition in this paper to provide the Choquet expected utility
representatiun is "cumulative dominance" ( P4 in Section 3). Simply staled, this
condition requires that if receiving cunseyuence a or a supcrior conseyuence is
considered mure likely for an act f than fur an acl ~,~, for cvcry n, thcn lhc act f
is prefcrrcd to thc act g. "This conditiun is lrivially satis(icJ for an SEU
maximizer. Unlike the sure-thing principle that forces tlie prubabilitics for all
events to be additive, cumulative dominance pcrmils that probabilitics for somc
events could be nunadditive. A probabilily function is nonaddilive if lhe
probability of the union of two disjoint evcnts is nut cqual to the sum of thc
indivídual probabilities of each event. An example below will show how nonad-
ditive probabilities could accommodate an aversion toward ambiguity.
The judgmcnts and prcferences that may Icad to nonadditivc probabilily have
becn rationalizcd by many authors. For example, Keynes ( 1921) has argucd that
confidcnce in probability in(luences dccisions under unccrtainty. Knight (1921)
made the distinclion between risk and uncertainty based on whether the event
probabilities are known or unknown. Recently Schmcidler ( 1989) has argued
that lhe amount of information available about an event may in(luencc prohabil-
itics in such a way that pruhabilities arc not ncccssarily additivc.
In a seminal paper, Ellsberg ( 1961) showed that if one acccpts Savagc's
dcfinition of probability thcn a majurity of subjccts violatcs addi[ivily of proba-
bility. Numerous expcriments since then have contirmed Ellsbcrg's findings.
Even though Ellsberg's examplc is well known we present it as it serves to
illustrate the motivation and direction for our proposcd modification of Savage's
thcory. Suppose an urn is filled with 90 balls, 30 of which are red ( R) and (i0 of
which are white ( W ) and yellow ( Y) in an unknown proportion. Onc ball will hc
drawn randomly from the urn and your payo(T will dcpcnd on thc color of thc
drawn hall and thc "act" ( dccisiun alternativc) you choosc. Scc Tablc I.
When subjects are askcd to choose betwccn acts j and g, a majority chouscs
act f, presumably bccause in act f the chancc of winning ~I11(10 is prcciscly
known to bc 1~3. In act ~; lhc chancc of dr.lwing a whilc ball is ambiguous sincc
the number of white balls is unknown. Now, when the same subjccts arc asked
TARLE I
Tnr El.lsllrrs~ OI'TI[1N5
~11 h:dh l~11 holl.
.~ol RcJ Whilc Vclhnv
j f I11011 SO Stl
R SIl Slcltx~ Sn
j" EllAln SD SI[xNl
R' SII SIINNI EIIMM)
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to choose between acts f' and R ', a majority chooses thc act g'. Again, in act
g', the chance of winning ~ 10(xl is precisely known to be 2~3, whercas in act f',
the chance of winning is ambiguous. 7'hus, subjecls tend to like spccificity and to
avoid ambiguity. By denoting c~(R), r(W), and c~(Y) as thc probability of
drawing a red, white, or yellow ball respectively, we obtain, assuming expected
utility with u(0) - 0: f} g implics
r,~R~t.~lo(~o~~r.~w~rr~l(xxl~, or r(R)~r~~w~;
g' ~ j' implics
r~~ w~u( looo~ t c~~ Y~tr~ lcx~j ~ r~( R~u( lo(x~~ f r~~ Y~rr~ lcwo~, or
t~(W~ ~ r~~ R~.
Thus, consistent probabilities cannot be assigned to the states, as c~(R) cannot
simultaneously be larger as well as smaller than n(W ). Clearly, in thc above
example no inconsistency results if c~(R U Y) ~ c(R) t c(Y). In our develop-
ment we permit nonnrldi~ic~e probabilities for some events (such as R V Y) that
we call ambiguous events. Our strategy is ro differentiate between ambiguous
and unambiguous events by requiring that only the acts that are measurable
with respect to unambiguous events satisfy Savage's axioms. General acts are
assumed to satisfy somewhat weaker conditions that may yield nonadditive
prohabilities for ambiguous cvcnts. It is to be noted that we do not requirc an
a priori definition of unambiguous or ambiguous events ( Cor the latter sce
Fishburn ( 1991)). We do, however, assume that thcre exists a subclass of events,
such as those generatcd by a roulctte whccl, such that an SEU representation
holds with respect to thesc events. Thc idca is that these cvcnts are unambigu-
ous. The subclass of unambiguous events sliould be rich enough to ensure tliat
all ambiguous events can be calibrated by appropriate bets contingent on
unambiguous events.
The strategy of permitting probabilities to be nonadditive and using them in
CEU was first proposed by Schmeidler (1989, first version 1982). Schmeidler
uses the sel-up of Anscombe ác Aumann ( 1963) (as rcfincd in Fishburn (1967,
1970, 1982)), where for every state an act Icads to an objective probability
distribution, to formulate his axioms and derive the result. A nonadditive
probability extension for the approach of Savage ( 1954) in full generality is very
complicated. Gilboa ( 1987) succeeded in finding such an extension. The result-
ing axioms are, however, quite complica[ed and do not seem to have simple
intuitive interpretations ( see Fishburn ( 1988, page 202)). In this paper, we
propose another extension of Schmeidler's model that in our view has a greater
intuitive appeal. The basic idea is to reformulate Savage's axioms to permit
nonadditivi[y in probabilíty for ambiguous events (event R V Y in Table I) whilc
preserving additivity for unambiguous events (event Yu W in Table I). Techni-
cally, our work may be viewed as a sort of unification of Gilboa (1987) and
Schmcidler ( 1989), and builds heavily on these works. Additional axiomatiza-
tions of CEU that assume some rich struc[ure on the consequences instead of
the states have been provided in Wakker (1989a,b, 1990a), and Nakamura
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(1990, 1992). Wakker (199(lb) has shown that CEU when applied to dccision
making under risk (where probabilities are cxtraneously specified) is idcntical to
rank-dependent (anticipated) utility. A survey of several independent discover-
ies of the CEU form has been given in Wakkcr (1991a).
Schmeidler's lottery-acts formulation may be viewed as a two-stage process
where a state s occurs in the first stage and in the second stage a lottery is
played to determine lhe final consequence. If probabilities are additive the
one-slage formulation (e.g., of Savage) and lhe two-stage formulation (e.g., of
Anscombe and Aumann) yield the samc conclusion. Howcvcr, as we shall sec, in
the nonadditive case the two formulations yield difíerent conclusions about the
preference rankings of acts.
We begin by presenting some notations and definitions in Section 2. Our
axioms and main result are stated in Section 3. In Section 4 we explore the
relationship between CEU and SEU models. An example and a general result
showing the irreconcilability of Schmeidler's two-stage formulation with a natu-
rally equivalent one-stage formulation are presented in Section S. Finally,
conclusions are contained in Section 6, and proofs are given ín the Appcndix.
2. DEfINII'IONS
2.1. Elemenlary Definilions
In this section we present the notation for the Savage (1954) style formulation
for decisions under uncertainty and introduce some definitions that are useful in
developing our results. There is a set ~ of cafsequences (payotfs, prizes,
outcomes) and a set S of stare.r of nanrre. The states in S are mutually exclusive
and collectively exhaustive, so that exactly one state is the true state. We shall
let s17 denote a o-algebra of subsets of S, i.e., .cr1 contains S, A e.~ implies
A` (the complement of A) e,td, and .rat' is closed under countable unions (this
will be generalized in Remark 3.3). Thus .ra~ also contains 0, and is closed
under countable intersections. Subjective probabilities or "capacities" will be
assigned to the elements of .sat; these elemcnts are called ecenrs. An event A is
informally said to occur if A contains the true state. The set ~ is also assumed
to be endowed with a o-algebra ~; this will only play a role for acts with an
infinite number of consequences.
A decision alternative or an acl is a function from S to ~ that is measrrrable,
i.e., f-1(D) e s~ for all D e~. If the decision maker chooses an act f, then
the consequence f(s) will result where s is the true state. The decision maker is
uncertain about which state is true, hence about which consequence will result
from an act. The set of acts is denoted as .~ Act f is constant if, for some
a e P, f(s) - a for all states s. Often a constant act is identified with the
resulting conscquence. Statements of conditions are simplified by defining f,~ as
the restriction of j to A, fAh as the act that assigns consequences f(s) to all
s eA, and consequences !1(s) to all s e S`A. Given that consequenccs are
identified with constant acts, fArY designates the act that is identical to f on A
and constant a on S`A; aA(3 is similar. Further, for a partition (A1,..., A,,,),
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we denote by a't~ ... a~;' the act that assigns conscquence a' to each s e A~,
j- l,..., m. Such acts arc callcd .ctcn acts.Z A binary relation ~ ovcr 3'~ givcs
the decision maker's preferences. 1'he notations ~, ~, ~, and ~ are as
usual. Further, Y is a weak order if it is complete (f} g or g~j for all j, g)
and lransitivc.
We define ~ on P from r on .tr through constant acts: a~~3 if j} g
where f is constant a, g is constant ~i. Postulate P3 will ensure that r on .~`
and r on P are in proper agrcement. We assume that Y and ~ are
compatible in the sense that all "preference intervals" are contained in ~. A
prejerence irrterual, as defined in Fishburn (1982), is a set E e D such that
rx, y e E, a Y R Y y imply ~ e E. A special casc is a set E such that a e E,
~i ~ a implies ~3 e E. Such sets are called cttmttlatice corrseqttence sets. They will
play a central role in this paper. Example A.4 below shows why, in the absence
of set continuity, cumulative dominance must include all cumulative conse-
quence sets and not just sets of the form {Q: )3 ~ a}; in the latter case
cumulative dominance would become too strong.
Following Savage (1954) (see also de Finetti (1931, 1937) and Ramsey (1931)),
wc define Y on st~ from r on 1F lhrough "bets on evenls:" A r B if there
exist consequences a}~i such that aA(3 Y art~i. Wc then say that A is more
likelv than B. Postulate P4 will ensure that Y on .cv' satisfies usual conditions
such as transitivity and completeness, and is in proper agreement with } on
.~; see also Lemma 2.1 in Section 2.2. Obviously, in Ihis paper the more-likely-
than rclation will not correspond to an additive probability; it will correspond to
a"capacity", i.e. a nonadditive probability; see L.emma 2.1.' We will make use
of a sub o-algebra .c~"" of .of that should be thought of as containing
unambiguous events, for example events generated by the spin of a roulette
wheel, or by repeated tosses of a coin. We denote by .~"~ the set of acts that
are ~i-.~l"" measurable; i.e., sF"" contains the acts j Cor which f-'( E) e s~""
for each E E~. We will assume that Savage's (1954) axioms are satisfied if
attention is restricted to the unambiguous events and ,5r"o.
An event A e.faf"" is rtull if f,rh ~ gAli tor all j, g e 5"'"; it is nonaudl
otherwise. -
2.2. Cfroquet Expected Utility
A function r: .tat-~ ( 0, 1] is a capacity if t'((b) - 0, u(S) - I, and c is mono-
lonic witlr respect to set-inclttsion, i.e., A~ B~ t'(A) ~ e(B). The capacity r,' is a
r Every step act is "simple," i.c., is measurable and has a finile range. If 1? contains every
one-element subset, then every simple act is a step act. Step acts turn out 1o be easier to work with
Ihan simple acts.
~
Sometimes a nonadctitive capacity is a strictly increasing transform of a probability measure,
which then al.cn representx the "morc likely than" relation. In general, however, a capacity will nol
be of that form.
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( finifcll' additit'e) probability ntetcscrre if, in additian, r is ndcli[ire, i.c.,
t~(AUB) -r(A) f r'(B)
for all disjoint A, B. A capacity e is conre.r-rarrged if for every A ~ C and every
t,. betwccn r'( A) and ,~(C) there exists A ~ B~ C such that n(B) -)e.
For a capacity r, and a measurablc function rh: S-~ 68, thc Choqucr inregrn!
of ~(with respect to r'), denoled f5rb dr, or f~ dr, or frl,, and introduced in
Choquet (1953-1954), is
(Í) f~ t'(~SE.S:rli(S)~r})[lTfJH ~!'((sES:cb(s)37})-1~[Í7.
In Wakker (1989b, Chapter VI) illustrations are given for thc Choquct intcgral.
We say that } maximizes Choqrret expecred utiJity (CGU) if thcre exist a
capacity r on .t~ and a measurable rdility fcrncrirnc U: ~~ UR such that the
preference relalion i is represented by f--. fti.U( f(s))dr; the laltcr is called
the Choquec expecred u!ilicy of f, denoted CEU( f). Suppose there are n states
sl,...,s„ and U(f(sl))3 ... ~ U(f(.s„)). Thcn
n-1
cEU(f) - E(~(f(s;)) - ~(I(s;.l))),'((s,,...,s;l) ~- ~(I( s„)).;-
The proof of the following lemma is left to the reader.
LeMnan 2.1: If } on .í~ ma.rimizes CEU, rhen dte rclarion r orr ~ is
represerrled hy 1He wilily juncuon U, and rhe relnriwr r ort .A~ is rcprese,trcd by
tlre capacity e whenee'er U is nonconsrar,t.
i. it,r n~nrN ttrsul.r
Apart from the well-known postulates of Savage on the unambiguous acts, we
shall use one additional postulate, "cumulative dominance" (P4 on the next
page), to govern preferences over ambiguous acts. It is a natural extension of
Savage's P4 to acts with more than two conscqucnces. When restricted to acts
with exacdy two consequences, our P4 is identical lo Savage's P4. It is best
appreciated as an adaptation of lhe stochastic dominanee condition. Let us
recall that slochastic dominance applies to decision making under risk, whcre
for each uncertain event A es~ a probability P(A) is well specified, and
usually ro is an interval within 98. In this setting, an act (or its probability
distribution as generaled over consequences) stochastically dominates another if
it assigns to each cumulative consequence set' at least as high a probability. In
the present set-up, without probabilities attached to each cvent, it is natural tu
say that an act j stochastically ("cumulatively") dominates an act g if the
decision maker regards each cumulative consequence set at Icast as likcly under
f as under g. Monotonicity with respect to stocliastic dominance, reformulaled
~ E.g.. rcceiving n or a superior mnsequence.
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with this adaptation, is our additional postulatc P4 below. It tums out that this
condition in the presence of the usual conditions, and Savage's conditions on a
rich set of unambiguous acts, is nccessary and suflicient for CEU. To readers
familiar with CEU and with Savage's sct-up, the proof of the main result may be
transparent if P4 is assumed. We hope that this mathematical simplicity is
viewed as a strength of the paper, becausc P4, in our opinion, is an intuitivcly
appealing assumption about bchavior undcr uncertainty as well.
We first state thc axioms and then the main theorcm, which is followed by a
discussion.
PcisTULn-rr P1: Wcuk ordering.
Pos-tvLnTr P2 ( The Surc-thing Principle for Unamhiguous Acts): For all
cr~enrs A and acts f, g, h, lí wr!!r f,rlr, g,rh, Inlí, gnlr' E,JF"":
fAll r gAl7 "i,llr~ } ó.4lí.
POSTULAT[ P3: For all erents A e si', acts f e g and corrsequences a, ~3:
a ~~3 ~ a,r f}~3,r j. Thc rer~ersed inp~lrcarion Irolds as rt~ell if A e s~"" A is
rrarrrull, artd f e .`í~""
Posi-uLn~~~ P4 (Cumulative Dominance): For all acrs j, g we lrare:
j r g wlterret'er f-~( E) rg-~( E)
for all ctumdarire consequence sets L.
Pos-ruLnre PS (Nontriviality): Tlrere erist consequences a,~3 such táar a r~3.
POSTULATF: PG (Fincncss of the Unambiguous Evcnts): If a E ro arrd, jur
f e.~T"", g e~; f rg, lherr Ilrere cxists a par[ition ( A ~, ..., A,,, ) oj S, wilh all
elemerus ir: .ca~"", such drar aA~ f Y g for all j, arrd the same holds widr ~ rrrstcad
of r .
The following postulate is Gilboa's adaptation of Savage's P7 to the case of
CEU. It is a technical condition, and is only needed for the extension of CEU to
acts with infinite range. In order to state the postulate, we define an event A to
be f-conrex if for any s, s" e A and s' e S, f(s) r f(s') r f(s") ~s' e A. Notc
below that, for some fixed s EA, j(s)A!r denotes the act that assigns j(s) to
each s' eA, and is identical to h on A`.
Posruunrr: P7: Forallf, g E,~ mrd rronenrply f-corrcex erenrs A,
f(s)Afrg forallsEA~j~S.
artd rhe same holds wiNr ~ instend of ~.
We now state the main theorem. In it, cardinal abbreviates "unique up to
scale and location."
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THEOREM 3.1: The jullowing nvo statements are equiralent:
(i) The prejerence relation ~ ntaximizes CEU for a óounded nonconstant
utilitp junction U on ~, and jor a capacity r un st~. Otr si~"" the capacity is
additire and concex-ranged.
(ii) Postulates P 1-P7 are satisfted.
Further, tlte uriluy jtatctiott in statemcnt ( i) is cardinal, and dtc capaciry is
ttniqtre.
ln the above result condition P4 can be weakened to the following "cumula-
tive reduction" condition, if in addition we include Savage's P4 (i.e., our P4
restricted to two-consequence acts). Cumulative reduction says that the only
relevant aspect of an act is its "decumulative" distribution. Cumulative reduc-
tion follows from two-fold application of P4, with the roles of f and g
interchanged. This condition is the only implication of P4 that we shall use in
the proof of Theorem 3.1 for acts with more than two consequences. We have
preferred to present the stronger P4 in the theorem because of its close
relationship with stochastic dominance.
POSTULATE P4' (Cumulative Reduction): For alf acts j, g we hace:
j- g wl:enecer j-'( E)~ g-~( E)
jur n!I cunttrlatit~e conseqtrence set.r E.
Let us also point out that all conditions can be weakened to hold only fur step
acts, with the exception of P1, the act g in P6, and P7. If P4,P4' is restricted
to step acts then cumulative consequence sets can be restricted to sets of the
form {~i e~: (3 } a} for some a e~. The next example considers the case~
where the state space is a product space. These are the cases considered by
Schmeidler. The above theorem applies to any case where there ;:. a sub
v-algebra isomorphic to the Borel sets on [0, 1] cndowed with the Lebesgue
measure; the latter is somewhat more general than product spaces. The tech-
nique of this paper allows for morc generality: the scts of ambiguous acts and
events can be quite general, as long as the set of unambiguous acts and events is
sufTiciently rich. This will be explicated in Remark 3.3. A further generalization
can be obtained in our one-stage approach by imposing on .~"'a the conditions
of Gilboa (1987) which lead to CEU, instead of using Savage's conditions which
lead to additive expected utility. The proof of this more general result is almost
identical to the proof of Theorem 3.1. In other words, as soon as there is a
sufficiently rich subse[ of acts on which CEU holds, then by cumulative domi-
nance CEU will spread over all acts. Alternatively, for the rich subset of acts, we
could have taken the set of probability distributions over the conseyuences, with
expected utility or rank-dependent utility maximized there. We chose Savage's
set-up because i[ is very appealing.
EXAMPLE 3.2: Let [0, 1] be endowed with the usual Lebesgue measure (i.e.,
uniform distribution) over the usual Borel rr-algebra. .R can be any set endowed
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with any R-algebra. Let S- d1 x[Q l], endowed with the usual product rr-alge-
bra; ~~ is any capacity that assigns the Lebesgue measure of E to any set 11 x G.
~ can be any arbitrary set, and U: ~-~ BF any function, nonconstant to avoid
triviality. Preferences maximize CEU. With .~"" the a-algebra of all sets of
the form f1 x E for E a Borel-subset of (0, 1], all Postulates Pl-P7 are satisfied.
REMnRK 3.3: The requiremcnl that .szl should be a rr-algebra, and that all
.ct~.4'i mcasurable functions from S to ~ should be included in .i can be
restricted to the unambiguous acts and events, as follows.
(i) .a~"" should be a v-algebra, and all srt"'-~ measurable functions from S
to ~ should be included in .sT.
Then, in addition, the following adaptations should be made. First, the
measurability requirement should be imposed that for all fe.~ and cumulatíve
consequence sets E, f-I(E) E.~. Second, Postulate P3 should be required only
if cr,, j, ~3A f e,~; Third, the nontriviality Postulate PS should be changed as
fol lows:
Posrut.nrE PS': There exist conseqtrences a r(3 such that aA~3,~, e.5T for a!!
erents A e ,a~.
PS' as such is not a necessary condition for the CEU representation. Fourth
and finally, for Postulate P7, needed for nonsimple acts, it should be required
that for all acts f e.~; f-convex events A, and states s E A, j(s),~ f be
contained in .5r (consequences can be "collapsed").
Note that this allows for great generality. For instance, ,at may consist of
.~"", events described by a roulette wheel, and a collection of events entirely
unrelated to the roulette wheel. There is no need to incorporate intersections or
unions of events described by the roulette wheel, and other events.
L.et us finally comment further on the uniqueness of the capacity in Theorem
3.1. Suppose Statement (i) in Theorem 3.1 holds. Would there exist CEU
representations that also represent the preference relation but have c nonaddi-
tive on .ctt""? The following observation answers this question.
OISSERVATION 3.4: Suppose Statemeitt ( i) in Tlaeorern 3.1 holds. Ijt{lere exist
!lrree or ntore eqtrit~alence dasses of carseqtiences, then jor any CEU representa-
tial the capacity will be additice on .át"". !f there exist no tnore than two
equiralence classes oj consequences, dlen any capacity can be taken dtat is a
sMctly increasing lransfonn of the capacity of Theorenr 3.1.5
`Only one will be addilive on .cd"" o( course.
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4. R[V[AL[D UNAMn1C'~UOUS LV[iNTS
In this section we characterizc rer~ealed unamhiguores events and partilions,
i.e., those for which the capacity is additive (defined below). It is possiblc that a
decision maker considers some events as ambiguous but nevertheless reveals an
additive capacity with respect to these. The characterization of this section will
lead to a generalization of the theorem of Anscombe and Aumann (19fi3). A
capacity is additice on a partition {A~,... , A,,,) if c(A U B) - c(A) t c(B) for
all disjoint events A, B that are unions of clements of the partition. This is
equivalent to additivity of the capacity on the algebra generated by the parti-
tion. A capacity is additice with respect to an even[ A if it is additíve with
respect to the partition (A,A`}, i.e., if r(A)- 1-r(A`). Gilboa (1989) used
the term symmetry for a capacity that is additivc with respect to each event. As
shown there, symmetry does not imply that the capacity is additive. A capacity is
additive if and only if it is additive on each partition, which holds if and only if it
is additive on each partition consisting of three events (consider, for disjoint
events A, B, the partition (A, B,(A U B)`}). In the presence of the rich .a~"' in
Theorem 3.1, the characterization of revealed unambiguous partitions is casy.
Note that in CEU additivity of the capacity immediately leads to SEU. Machina
and Schmeidler (1990) consider the case with an additive probability measure
on the events, and a general (nonexpected utility) functional, such as used in
Machina (1982). Like our main result, thcir main result weakens Savage's
sure-thing principle and strengthens his P4. Their P4 implies tlie sure-thing
principle for two-consequence acts, which our P4 obviously does not. In addi-
tion, it implies, mainly in the presence of P6, our P4. The Ellsberg paradoxes
give examples where their P4 is violated while our P4 is satisfied.
PROPOSITION 4.1: Suppose Statetnent ( i) in 7lreorcm 3.1 holds. Let
{Ar,..., A,,,} be a partition. The following four statements are eqttiralent:
(i) Tlre capacity is additit~e on Ihe partilion.
(ii) For nl! disjourt A and A' that are mtions oj eletnents of the partitiorr, and
jor disjoint unantbiguous et~enls B"" ~ A B"" ~ A', we hare A UA' ~ B"" U B""
(iii) There exists an tutmnbiguous partition ( Bi ", ., B„',") such dtar
crÁ ~ ... aq -- a~~„... a~f;;, jor al! conseqtrences a',... , cr"'
(iv) For eadt totantbigttotts partition {B~'", ., B"") we hare:
( 2) ,q i U... UA~ ," B;a U... U Bj'"
jor all j ~ aÁ ... a;~ - air.d ... aH~,.~ jor afl cotrsequettces a~, , a"'
We could obviously obtain additivity of thc capacity r in Statcmcnt (i) of
Theorem 3.1 by adding any of the conditions in Statements (ii), (iii), or (iv)
above, for each partition, to Statement (ii) of Theorem 3.1. Given the impor-
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tance of the result that can be dcrivcd from Statement ( iv), Ict us make the
condition explicit: -
PUSTULnI'E P4" (Reduction): Foreaclt partition ( Ar,...,A,„) and eacl: unane-
hit;unrrs pnrtition ( 13~".. ., 13,'„"), (2) ltolds lnrc.
If in the definition of reduction we would havc addcd Ihe condition that the
conscqucnccs in (2) are rank-ordcrcd, i.c., crl ~..- ~cr,,,, thcn thc condition
would have been identical to P4' (cumulative reduction) restricted to step acts,
which is all of P4 that is needed apart from its restriction to two-consequence
acts (i.e., Savage's P4). P4" resembles the reduction principle in Fishburn
(1988), which is called neutrality in Yaari (1987). This principle says that if (or
two acts consequences are in some sense equally likely, then the acts are
equivalent.
CoROLLnRt' 4.2: !n Statement (i) oJTheorent 3.) additirity of tlre capacity can
fie added ij in Staternent ( ii) P4 ( c[un[datire dontinance) is replaced by I'4"
(redtrction) phts tlte res[riction ojP4 to two-consequertce acrs.
The atwvc corollary can be regarded as a generalization of the result of
Anscombe and Aumann (19b3) and Fishburn (1967). Their structure is rich
enough to satisfy PI-P3, P4", and PS-P7. The sct-up of thc above comllary is
more general in exactly the same way that the set-up of Theorem 3.1 is more
general than the result of Schmeidler (1989): The state space is not required to
be a Cartesian product of ambiguous and unambiguous events. All that is
needed is that the set of unambiguous events be rich enough. In the same way
that Thcorem 3.l can be considered a unification of the results of Schmeidler
(1989) and Gilboa (1987), the above corollary can be considered a unification of
thc results of Anscombe and Aumann (1963) and Savage (1954). The kcy
feature in either case is that the events generated by a random device arc
incorporated within the state space. We think this is more natural than the
two-stage approach of Anscombe and Aumann (19fi3). In the practice of
decision analysis, objective probabilities of events A"" generated by a roulette
wheel will typically be used as in Lemma A.1 in the Appendix to elicit
"unknown" probabilities. This in no way requires a two-stage structure. While
Theorem 3.1 was (apart from convex-rangedness) less general than Gilboa's
result, the above corollary is a generalization of both Anscombe and Aumann's
result and Savage's result. A gcncralization as indicated in Remark 3.3 can also
be obtained for the above corollary.
An earlier result along these lines, within the classical additive set-up, is
Bernardo, Ferrandiz, and Smith (1985). Corollary 4.2 is more general, mainly
because, unlike Bernardo et al., we do not require a stochastic independence
relation as a primitivc, or existence of independent unambiguous events.
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S. NONEQUI VALENCE OI. ONE- AND TWO-STAGE API'ROACHES
Schmeidler made the novcl contribution of showing that CEU is capable of
permitting attitudes toward ambiguity that are disallowed by Savage's SEU.
Schmeidler stated his axioms using the horserace-roulette wheel set-up of
Anscombe and Aumann (1963). This is a two-stage set-up; i.e., ín the first stage
an event (e.g., the horse Sccretariat winning) obtains and in the sccond stage
the consequence is determined depending, for example, on a roulette wheel. In
Schmeidler's modcl capacities are assigned lo first-stage events. Further, the
lotteries in the second stage are evaluatcd by lhc usual additivic expccted utility.
An act assigns to each first-stage event a lottery, thus an expected utility value.
The Choquet integral of these (with respect to the capacity over the first-stage
events) gives the evaluation of the act. In our one-stage approach we embed the
roulette wheel lotteries within Savage's formulation by enlarging the state space
S. Our one-stage approach is complementary to the two-stage approach of
Schmeidler as it provides additional (lexibility in modeling decisions under
uncertain[y. This one-stage approach to CEU was introduced in Becker and
Sarin (1989).
ln the SEU theory, whether the one-stage or a two-stage approach is
employed is purely a matter of taste or convenience in modeling. In the CEU
framework, however, these two variations producc theoretically different results.
We demonstrate this theoretical nonequivalence of one-stage and two-stage
approaches through an example. Our analysis gives further evidence that
multi-stage set-ups in nonexpected utility may cause complications. G~rdenfors
and Sahlin (1983), Luce and Narens (1985), Luce (1988), Luce (1991), Luce
(1992), Luce and Fishburn (1991), Segal (1987), and Segal (1990) focus on
distinctions between one- and two-or-more-stage set-ups. Segal (1990) uses a
two-stage set-up to describe an ambiguous event. Probabilities within each stage
are assumed to be additive but they do not follow multiplicative rules between
the two stages. Segal showed how dominance type axioms can provide nonex-
pected utility characterizations in the two-stage set-up (also see Wakker (19916)).
ExAn~rLE 5.1: This example is a small variation on one of the paradoxes of
Ellsberg. The preferences used in the example below are consistent with those
observed in the Ellsberg paradox. Further, the single-stage capacitíes are
uniquely determined by the equivalent two-stage model of Schmeidler.
Suppose a biased coin and an unbiased coin will be tossed. The possible
states of nature are HhH"", H"T"h,ThH"!',T"T"h, where H"T"" denotes the
state where the biased coin lands heads up and the unbiased coin lands taifs up,
and so on. For simplicity assume that utility is known and that payment is in
utility. It follows in Schmeidler's model that subjects consider a bet of l on
H"h5 as well as a bet of 1 on T"" equivalent to 1,2 for certain (given that
payment is in utility). It has been observed that subjects will typically consider a
bet of 1 on H~ as well as a bet of 1 on Tn less preferable. Let us assume the
latter bets are equivalent to a for certain, for some number rY c 1,2.
"Such a txl gives 1 if H"~ obtains and 0 if T"" obtains.
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P4 (unce with a, once with a), is equivalenl lo the ambiguous act. 11s SGU valuc can, similarly to
the Chcpuet integral, be written as P(A~)U(n~)t(P(RiUR.)-P(D~)JU(az)t --- -F(I-
P( lit V... V Il," - t)kl(e"'). This shcnvs that it is identical to Ihc C~U valuc of the amhiguous act.
So indeed CEU represents preferenttx belwecn all slep acls.
The cxtension of lhe CEU representation to non-step acts is mainly hy P7, and is similar lo
Gilboa (19R7). Note that this in particular establishes lhe expected utility representation on the
entire set .5r"". Contrary to Gilboa (19R7), our capacily need not be convex-ranged. We can
however follow the reasoning of his Subsection 4.3 wilh only unambiguous step acts f, ~. Convex-
rangednes.c is used there for the existence of ~, while convex-rangednesx of P sutfices for that. fn
the prcxif of his Theorem 4.3.4, in Stalement (i), the act j can always be chexen unambiguous, by
Lemma A.2. Lct us alui mention that nne cannot restrict P7 to .f"'". This would be fxKSible if for
each ambiguous act there would exist an unambiguous act with lhe same cumulative distribution.
This however is not the case in general. For example if P ís coontably additive, then it cannot
generate strictly finitely additive distributions; e.g., with L- R, it does not generate cumulative
distrihution functions that are not continuous from the right. Also it is pcxsible that for inslance
U( 6) e[Il. I(. P is countahly additive, and there exisls a pcxitive r such that under an ambiguous
act j each cumulative event {s E S: j(.r) a a) (0 t Q G I) has capacity at Ieast r.
The utility functions must be bounded, as follows [rom the repre.sentation on .S~"". This is shown
in Fishburn (1970, Section 14.1), and the second 1972 editinn of Savage (1954, footnote on p. Rfl).
Finally we cstablish Ihe uniquenes.s results. I)y the standard results of Savage (1954) we get
cardinality of U, and uniqueness of lhe restriction P of t~ to .c~"". The extension of r to .o!`.nI""
shows thal r is uniquely determined.
Ncxt let us suppose lhal t~ is atlowed to be nnnadditive on .4""", as studied in Observation 3.4.
L.et us at first also suppose that there are three or more nonequivalent cunsequences. Then lhe
representation, if restricted lo .5~"", satisfies all conditions in Gilboa (19R7); hentt hy his unique-
ness results the restriction of r to .5r"" is unique, ur additive. T'he uniquencss of r follows in the
same way as above. Let us finally consider the case where there are exactly two equivalence clacus
of consequences, with say (~ rl. Any U' instead of U in a CEU representation is ainstant nn
equivalence classes of consequences and satisfies U(S)1U(q). So U' is a strictly increasing
transform of U, and otwiously is bounded. Given the twn-valued range, U is cardinal. Recause any
r' in a CEU representation has to repre.ant the same ordering rner eventx as t, r' must he a strictly
increasing transform of r. Cunversely, any such t' will do. Thus it is possible to chouse r such that
it is not convex-ranged and not additive on .itt"'". It can however always be chusen such that it is
convex-ranged and additive on .al"".
For the proof of Remark 3.3, note that all constructions in the proof of the implication (ii) m(i)
of Theorem 3.1 (including [he extension to nonsimple acts, following Gilboa (19R7)) remain pos.cible
under the conditions of Remark 3.3.
Our resull has not established convex-rangedness of the capacity r. That can be characterized by
addition of one rnndition, Gilboa's P(,`. We propose to rename this as "solvability." Solrabifiry is
satisfied if for all acts j, R, consequenccs a~~, and events A, if a~j r g a~,r j, and Q,r j, p,r j
"mmonotonic" (Vs EA`: j(s) a a or f(s) ac ~), Ihere exists an event B cA such Ihat aNPA nja. ~
g. That solvability, even if restricted tu two-conscquence acts, is suHicient for convex-range~ncca of
t~, follrnvs mainly from mnvex-rangedness of P, which gives all desired "intermediate" R- Nececsily
is straightforward.
PaorostnoN A.3: Suppose Sfaranenr (i ) in Prmrem 3.1 holds. 77tcn e~ i.r conru-rongcd ij nnd
only ij a satisfics sdtohilip..
For the case of three or more equivalence classes of consequenccs, a more general derivation,
without use nf ,fT "", is given in Gilboa (19R7). If there are exactly two equivalence classes nf
consequences and t- is not required to be additive on .oI"", Ihen, by Obxrvation 3.4, t~ need not be
convex-ranged, even if solvability is satisfied.
The following example shows why we used cumulalive rnnsequence sets, inslead of less general
sets of the form (~ E 6: S a a} for a E C, in the dcfinition P4 of cumulative dominance, and its
derivatíves P4' and P4". Note that the distinction is relevant only tor nonstep acts, and that we could
have restricted P4, P4', P4" to step acts. In that cax we could have used the less general sets as
mentioncd above.
Ex~Mrt.e A.4: Suppose thc special case of Statement (i) in Theorem 3.1 holds where in fact all
of Savagei axioms are satisfied. So r is an additive probability measure, that we denote by P. L.et
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integrand in ( I) is at least as large for ~ s U" j as for ab a U"g. So jaF, as P4 rcquires. PS is
direct fmm nonconstantness of U. For P6, Iet f e bT"", g e S, j a g (thc case j i g is similar) and
u e t;. By Mwndedness of utility, there exists u~(1 such th:u Vs e.S: U( f(.c)) - U(a ) ~ rs. liernusc
r is convex-ranged wilhin .N"", we can take a partition (Ar,... , A,,,) of S such that Ar e.N"" and
r(A) ~(CEU( j) - CEU( g))~ta for all j.
Ftiir P7, let j, g e 9; and let A e.aI be a nonempty evcnt ( f-oonvexity of A will rrot be used).
Thcn, with U' a U" f nn A`, and U' - inf,r U e j(inf is real-valued hy nnnempliness of A and
houndcdncca of U) on A, thc prcmisc in P7 implics
fU"jdu2 fU'dr-inf,En(fU'I(.r),rjdr~~CGU(g).
Next we suppnse ( ii) holds, and derive ( i) and the uniquenelss results, including Observation 3.4. Il is
immediale that Savage's poslulatcs PI-P6 hold true on 3"". So we get an SCU representation nn
5""', which denotes the set of step acts in ,~"". There exist a cardinal utility function U: L--~ R
and a unique additive probability measure P on .aI"", such that expected utility represents
prefercnces on .5r' "". We call P(A) the "probability" o( A. ns follows from Savage (1954), P is
alomless and satisfies convex-rangednes.c. Obviously, P will bc lhe restriction o( r to .`t"".
L.et us next extend the CEU representation as now established fur all unambiguous step aclc, to
all step acts. First we define the capacity r. By PS there are consequences { a q, which are kcpt
fixed throughout the proof.
l.rMUrn A.I: Far eaclt erenr A drerc exisrs aa A"" e.N"" surlr rhal {,rq -{,r.,q.
PRrxir: By P2, {s~ a{~~ s{y~. Suppnse Ihat in fact {rrl i{,r,! i{y~ (Mherwise we are donc
immediately), and that for event B"" e.M"" we have {,rq i{A...~ (e.g., B"" a 0). This implies
P((B"")' )1 0. By P6, there exists a partition Ct....,C„ of S, wilh all Cr e.N"", such that
{n,,.~r.n ~{aq for all j. There exists at least one Crn(B""Y with strictly positive pmhability. So
there ézists an event B"" .- B"" U Ci with prubability strict(y greater than B"", and such lhat still
{n~ i{n'..~. Sn. using mnvex-rangednecc, the set of prnbabililics nf events B"" as above must he of
Ihe form 10,p-( fnr snme t) Cp-G 1.
Similarly, the set of probabilities of cvenls C"" e.cy"" such that {~n ~{r.,",n, must he uf Ihe
form Jp', I] for some 0 Fp`t 1. The only pos.cibilily is p-sp', By rnnvex-rangedness there cxists
an cvent A"" e.ol"" with pmbability p-. Now {,r,, -{,r...,) is tbe on(y poccibility. t).E.D.
Thus, for every A e.al, there exists an A"" that is cqually likely. Bcc:wsc each Ixxsible cMiice of
A"" has the same P value, we can define r~: A-~ P( A""), extending r~ from .d"" (where e. ~ I') lo
the entire .ul. For monotonicily with respect to sct-inclusion, suppose that A 7B. Thcn, by P2,
{,r,, ~{q~. From this r( A) a' r( 8) follows, and r is a capacily.
To establish the CEU representation for all step acts, we construct for each ambiguous step act
an unambiguous one "wirh rlre samc cunrulatire disrrifimiovr." That is, for the amhiguous anJ the
unambiguous acts the events o( obtaining a consequence at least as good as a are cqually likely, Grr
each consequence a. Fnr step acts lhis is nol rmly neceswry, hul also suR'icient, to h-rve all
cumulative consequence sets equally likely under the two acts. First we extend Lemma A.I. The
proof of the extensiun is completely similar, with p, v in the place of {, ~, furthcr j in the placc of
{nq, and p x ja v implied by P4.
LtSntMn AZ: For each acr jfar whit'h drere ezisf carsequenc'es p, v such drat (Vs e S: p. aj(s ) a v J,
drere erisrs an A"" e.aI "" such rhar p.A".v ~j.
Obviuusly, by the SEU represenlation as already established, {,r".,1 ~{R".,f for each unambigu-
ous event 8"" equally likely as A"'. By rnnvex-rangednes.c of P, and Lemma A.I, fur each partition
A~...., A,,, of S we can find an unambiguous partition Bi,..., B," of S such lhat Ai U~.. vA~ is
equally likely as Bi V ~.. U B~, tor each j. To dn so, first we find an unambiguous Bi -At, and set
Br :- D~. Next we find an unambiguous B'Z -Ai UA2. By rnnvex-rangedness of P, we can find an
unamhiguuus Bi with B, n Br ~ 0 such that P( Br U B, ) ~ P( B; ), w that Br U Bz -- A i UA,, and
so on. The next paragraph is the central part of lhe prrxif, and is simple. The other parts of the
proo( are all slandard after Savage ( 1954), using Gilhoa's (1987) P7.
Let aA~...aA," be an arbilrary step act, wilh a~ ~... ~a'". We take an unambiguous partitkm
(Br,...,B„,) as descritxd above. The unambiguous act a~~...aR~ Iry two-fnW application uf
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!n Sarin and Wakker (1990, Thcorem 10) it is shown that the resull of thc
above example holds in full gencrality. "I'hat is to say, only undcr cxpccted utilily
can the one- and two-stage approach of CEU bc cyuivalent. As sucm as the
capacity is nonadditive in Schmeidler's two-stage approach, the equivalent
one-stage approach is not a CEU model.
6. CONCLUSInN
Savage's SEU thcury is widely accepted as a rational lhcory of dccision
making under uncertainty in economics and decision sciences. Unfortunately,
however, people's choices violate the axioms of SEU theury in some well-
defined situations. One sucli situatiun is when event prubabilities are ambigu-
ous. In this paper we have shown that a simple extension of SEU theory called
Choquet expected utility (CEU) theory can be derived by assuming a natural
cumulative dominance condition. CEU permits a subject tu assign probabilities
to events so that the probability of a union of two disjoint events is not
necessarily the sum of the individual event probabilities. The violation of
additivity may occur because a person's choice may be influenced by the degrce
of confidence or specificity about the event prubabilities.
Schmeidler and Gilboa have also proposed axioms to derive tlie CEU repre-
sentation. Building on their work, we have provided the simplcst dcrivation of
CEU presently available. Also, conditions havc been given under which CEU
reduces to SEU. It is also shown that unlike SEU lheury, where a one-stage
set-up of Savage or a two-stage set-up of Anscombc and Aumann yield idcntical
results, the two-stage CEU formulation of Schmeidler cannot be reconciled with
a one-stage furmulatiun unlcss event probabilities are additive. In our upinion
the one-stage set-up as uscd by Gilboa seems more appropriatc in single-pcrson
decision theory. We hope that uur work has clarified the distinction betwccn
CEU and SEU theories and that it will stimulate further research and addi-
tional explorations of CEU. ~
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APPENDEX: Pkcx~Fs
A1. 1'rrx~j oJ Thrnrrm .?. ). Rrnr~Irk .?. i, nnd Obserrutinn í.4
Fur the implicaliun ( i) y(ii) in Theorem 3.1, suppnse ( i) holds. Then PI follnws direcdy. P2 anJ
P3 are standard resuhs from, mainly, the usual additive expccted utility theory. Fur Pustulale Pa,



































In the two-stage set-up of Anscombe-Aumann and Schmeidler, decisions are
formulated as shown in Figure la. For the act f shown in Fígure la, the
two-stage approach yields CEU(f)- 0, because the probability of H"~ and T"n
is 1~2. Thus, f is judged indifferent to a constant act g with consequence 0.
Note that our assumption stated in the preceding paragraph implies that, with
v'" denoting the capacity in the two-stage approach, c'"( H") - e'"(T~) ~ a.
Now consider the one-stage formulation of the act in Figure la as depicted in
Figure 1 b. To evaluate CEU(f) in Figure lb we need the single-slage capaci-
ties, now denoted o' to distinguish from the capacities in the two-stage ap-
proach, c'(HhH"h) and v'(H~H"~,T~H"h,T~T"h). For consistency with the
two-stage approach ( see the boxed columns in Figures la and lb), the first
column in Schmeidler's two-stage approach is equivalent to a~2 and the second
column to a x 1 t(1 - a) x q~ Z f Za, so f~'(HbH"~) - a~2 and
c~(HhH"~,T~H"",ThT"h)- Z} Za must be chosen. Hence, in the one-stage
approach, CEU( f) is a~2 f(1 -( l~2 f a,2)X - 1) ~ a- 2 G 0; it follows that
f~ g( - 0). Thus the one-stage approach and the two-stage approach yield
different results, and are irreconcilable. They only agree in the additive case
a- 1~2.
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Bn (- 1 ~1: J E N) U(I t I ~j: j E RI), and let U be the identity. Lct (Ai)~.. i U ( Bi)j„ r be a partition
of S, (A'~)~, r U [B~) another partition of S. A- U~. r Ai, B, A', B' are defined similarly. Suppose
that P(A~) a P(A';), P(Bi) ~ P(B~) tor all j. Further suppose that P(A) ~ P(A').
Such cases can be constructed if P is not set-conlinuous, i.e., not countably additive. Let j assign
1 t l~j to each Ai, and - I~j to each Bi. Similarly j ' assigns 1 f Ijj to each A'J, and - I~j toeacb B~. For each mnsequence I t 1 ~j we have P( j(s) a 1 t 1 jj )~ E;. i P(A J ~ E;. i p( A'i) a
P(j'(s)a I t I~j). Foreachconsequence -I~j wehave P(j(s)a -I~j)o 1-~(j(s)~ -I~j)a
1-E;-~P(B;)~ 1-}:;;~iP(B,)-P(j'(s)a -I~j). So for each aE ~: (sES: f(s)aa)-
(s E S: j'(s) a a). However, fnr 0~ ~a ~ I, P( j(s) a u) ~ P( A) ~ P( A') - P( j'(s) a y.). Uy Formula
(1), CEU( j) - CEU( j') a I x (P(A) - P(A')) ~ 0. So J~f'. Only for cumulative consequence sets
E.-[~(,ro( wilh p as ahove we do no[ havc j'-r(E)a j-'(L).
A2. Prrx)jojProlwsirion J.J.
The implications ( i) y(ii) and (i) ~(iv) are direct. The implication ( i) ~(iii) follows from
convex-rangedness of P. Next we prove that Statement (i) is implied by each of the otherstatements. ( ii) ~(i) is direct. (iii) a(ii) follows from taking A and A' as union of A~'s, taking B""
and B""' as union of corresponding B!""s, and from Ihc equivalences (with ( a rf) (~,, .. [R„,~,
~~'n ~~R"-'n. Cn v ~'rl ~ SA„-~ p ~.-.n. Finally, suppuse ( iv) holds. Similarly to Ihe reasoning IxlowLemma A.2, we can show thc existence of an unambiguous partitiun (B~ ",..., B,'„') such that
A~ U-.. UAi - B~" U-.- U B;'" for all j. For any A thm is a union of Ar's-dilfercnt-from-A ~, andB"" a union of corresponding BJ's, we have, by (2), (,r ~,r ~ ~ Sn,.,~ a„n and Snn ~ Sn--B- Takingdifferences and dividing by the positive U(~)-U(rl) we get r(AUÁ~)-r(A)sP(B""VB~")-
P(B"") n P(Bi"). So the "decision weight" th;rt A~ contributes to each union o( the other A~b, isindependcnt of those aher A,'s. The same hulds for each A,. Hence the capacity of a union ofdifferent A~'s is the sum of the separate capacities c is additive on the partition.
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